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Responsible Grace:
The Systematic Perspective of Wesleyan Theology
Randy L. Maddox
An essay investigating the systematic nature of John Wesley’s theology must strike many
readers as misconceived. The conventional wisdom is that Wesley was primarily an evangelist
and the organizer of a renewal movement within Anglicanism, not a systematic theologian. This
opinion has been voiced as loudly by Wesleyan theologians as by outside observers. Consider,
for example, Carl Michalsen’s assessment that “preaching and not theology was the main
concern of John Wesley.”1 As Rupert Davies notes, even Wesley’s strongest defenders are often
willing to concede that, far from being a creative and systematic thinker, he was a third-rank
theologian.2 
A pointed example of the hesitancy concerning Wesley’s stature as a systematic
theologian was provided at the Bicentennial Consultation on Wesleyan Theology held at Emory
University in August 1983. In the section dealing with systematic theology, major papers were
presented on the theme of the contribution of Wesleyan theology for the future. The theses of
several of these papers are revealing. Durwood Foster listed several assets of the Wesleyan
tradition, focusing on its ability to preserve a tension between such themes as grace and freedom.
However, his central judgment was that Wesley’s own theology ultimately lacked a unifying
perspective.3 Thomas Langford located the major significance of Wesley in the fact that he
inaugurated the first major religious movement after the inception of the Enlightenment. As
such, Wesley presented one of the first models for mediating biblical theology to a “secular”
world. However, given the drastic changes between our setting and Wesley’s, Langford
concluded that Wesley offers contemporary theologians more bases than conclusions.4 M.
Douglas Meeks located the central contribution of Wesley’s approach to theology in his
emphasis on relating theology to the praxis of the church and the situation of the poor. Meeks
then suggested a similarity between Wesley’s approach and that of contemporary liberation
theology. In that light, he argued that Wesleyan theologians should no longer be chagrined at the
charge that Wesley was a “peoples’ theologian.”5 
8Meeks’ assessment of Wesley’s contribution to theology is clearly the most positive. However,
even it concurs implicitly with the conventional perspective that Wesley’s main contribution is
not to be found in the area of systematic theological reflection.
There are two basic reasons behind the conventional evaluation of Wesley. Albert Outler
notes the first when he suggests Wesley was not a “theologian’s theologian.” That is, Wesley did
not pursue theology primarily in dialogue with and in the scholarly language of professional
theologians. Rather, he developed what Outler calls a “folk theology,” expressing the Christian
message in its fullness and integrity in “plain words for plain people.”6 Rupert Davies expresses
the second reason when he notes that Wesley never composed a Summa: i.e., a system that
embraced the whole range of Christian revelation and related it to the other departments of
human knowledge.7 As Wood summarizes both of these points, “Wesley’s theology was
practical and occasional rather than theoretical and systematic.”8
No doubt, the preceding observations are basically correct. However, the condescending
value judgments implied in them are subject to question. Such questioning may help to uncover
the organic unity in Wesley’s own theology, which Outler notes is missed by so many.9 It may
also provide a theological norm for contemporary Wesleyan theology.
New Perspectives on the Nature of Systematic Theology
Perspective for evaluating the conventional assessment of Wesley as a theologian can be
gained from the contemporary debates about the scholarly and systematic nature of theology.
This subject has been most seriously debated by European theologians. However, it has also
received significant consideration in the Americas. The most common format for the discussion
has been the use of a particular philosophical conception of the nature of scholarly inquiry
(Wissenschaftstheorie) to either critically evaluate the nature of theological reflection or to
construct an ideal model of theological reflection.10 
One of the most helpful contributions of this recent discussion has been the overcoming
of the dominance of a model of scholarly theological activity which has reigned through much of
medieval and modern Christian thought. Whether in the form of an Aristotelian Summa or an
Hegelian Encyklopadie, this dominant model has functioned under the premise that the ideal
approach to theology is one concerned with: (a) the systematic investigation of the entire range
of Christian revelation and (b) the rational demonstration of the truth claims of Christian faith in
view of the breadth of human knowledge. Within such a model, the theological reflections of
Wesley (or Luther!) would obviously be second-rank at best. The claim to a truly scholarly and
systematic theology would be limited to the likes of Aquinas and Calvin. 
What has characterized the recent discussion is the development of alternative
conceptions of the nature and goal of theology based on some recent philosophical reconceptions
of the nature of scholarly activity.11 In particular, there is a significant and growing group of
theologians who have drawn on such perspectives as analytic philosophy and the critical
theorists
9of the Frankfurt School to develop an understanding of scholarly theology that is “practical” or
integrally related to the life and practice of the Christian community. An understanding of the
basic conception and implications of one of the most helpful such approaches can be gained by
considering its main proponent-Gerhard Sauter.12
Sauter argues explicitly against the Hegelian tendency to judge the scholarly nature of an
activity such as theology by its ability to construct a comprehensive system that can be clearly
integrated with the large: system of all human knowledge. Instead, Sauter follows Karl Popper in
claiming that the true test of scholarship should be that any particular discipline proceed about its
activity in light of critically-assessed methods.13 Thus, a theologian would be considered
scholarly if she or he proceeded according to critically-assessed methods, even though they
never constructed an embracive theoretical system of thought.
Building on this point, Sauter asserts that the primary task of theology is a practical one;
namely, critical reflection on the life and practice of the church. The ultimate value of
theological reflection is not found in its abstract theoretical moments, but rather in the use of the
results of such moments for critiquing and norming contemporary church discourse and life.14
The overarching goal of theology is to bring the tradition of Christian doctrine and the skills of
disciplined thought to bear in solving the practical problems of the contemporary Christian
community.15 As a corollary, the goal of theological education is not primarily the memorization
of a system of theology, but rather the formation of an ability to make theologically responsible
judgments.16
The question, of course, is “What constitutes a theologically responsible judgment?” Two
basic sets of considerations become evident in Sauter’s discussion. The first set deals with
methods of theological investigation. Included here would be consideration of the sources
consulted for relevant insights (Scripture, tradition, psychology, etc.) and the manner in which
these sources were consulted (e.g., historical critical method).17 The second set of considerations
deals with the methods and structure of theological judgment. Included here would be
consideration of how the various relevant insights are related to each other and to the problem
being addressed.18 Accordingly, a responsible theological judgment is one which uses critically
appraised methods of theological investigation and judgment to address the practical problems of
the life and thought of the Christian community.
So far, our discussion of Sauter has focused on his understanding of how theologians
should make particular theological judgments. While this is the heart of Sauter’s approach, it
must not lead to a misperception of Sauter as unconcerned with the systematic nature of
theology. While he does reject the idea that the primary goal of theology is to construct intricate
theological systems, he is very concerned with systematic theological reflection.19 One of his
most basic requirements for responsible theological judgments is that one investigate the
relationship of other problems and the various themes and concepts of Christian doctrine to the
situation under consideration. For example, an adequate theological evaluation of glossolalia
would include not only considerations of biblical and historical precedents, but also,
consideration of the implications of 
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such a practice for one’s understanding of the nature of the Imago Dei, the finality of the
revelation of Jesus Christ, etc.
It is in the context of this last point that one of Sauter’s most important contributions, for
our purposes, is found. A perennial frustration of Christian theologians is the fact that
representatives of different theological traditions can often consider the same issue or problem,
drawing on the same theological sources and using the same critical methods of investigation,
and arrive at significantly different conclusions. Sauter’s analysis of the nature of theological
argumentation and systematization provides a convincing explanation of this phenomenon. He
notes that the various concepts of theology (revelation, justification, law/gospel dialectic, etc.)
should be distinguished into at least three categories.20 The crucial category, for our purposes, is
what he calls “orienting concepts.” Orienting concepts play a unique role in theological
argumentation. They are not utilized as one topic among others to be organized. Rather, they
provide the integrative thematic perspective in light of which all other theological concepts are
understood and given their relative meaning or value.21 Sauter’s point is that the difference
between rival theological traditions lies not so much in their differences over particular doctrines
as in their choice of orienting concepts. 
This point can be illustrated by a comparison of Luther and Calvin. By Sauter’s
standards, Luther would be a systematic theologian if it could be shown that his attempts to
address the practical problems of the church of his day were guided by a consistent orienting
concept (or set of related orienting concepts). In recent Luther investigation, it has become quite
clear that the concept of justification by faith (and the related concepts of a theology of the cross
and the law/gospel dialectic) function as such an orienting concept in his theological reflection.22
In the case of Calvin, the mere fact that he developed a comprehensive handbook of Christian
doctrine would not in itself qualify him as a systematic theologian. To be considered as such, it
would be necessary to show that his system of theology evidenced the influence of a consistent
orienting concept. (We are all painfully aware that summaries of Christian doctrine abound
which have no such consistency). Again, it is widely agreed that the concept of the sovereignty
or majesty of God functions as the chief orienting concept in Calvin’s theology.23
The point of Sauter’s analysis is that the crucial difference between Luther’s theology
and that of Calvin lies not in individual doctrines but in the perspective and selectivity exercised
on all doctrines by their respective orienting concepts. To take just one example, both Luther and
Calvin endorsed a doctrine of personal predestination. However, this seeming point of agreement
between the two theologians is also a key example of their differences because they each opt for
and understand predestination from the perspective of their chief orienting concepts. For Luther,
the doctrine of predestination is primarily a safeguard against any form of works-righteousness.
By contrast, for Calvin, it is an expression of the final sovereignty of God and hence, the
certainty of salvation.24
This example has important implications for any contemporary claim to express, for
example, an authentic Calvinist theology. The crucial criterion for deciding such a claim would
not be the number of direct 
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quotations from Calvin. Neither would it be the mere fact that one endorsed the doctrine of
predestination. Rather, it would focus on whether one’s theological perspective was guided
throughout by Calvin’s distinctive chief orienting concept.
Wesley as a Scholarly and Systematic Theologian
What would be the effect on the conventional evaluation of Wesley as a scholarly and
systematic theologian if Sauter’s reflections on the nature of systematic theology were accepted
as valid?
In the first place, the fact that, far from being a summa, Wesley’s theological writings and
reflections were nearly all occasional and directed to specific problems in the church of his day
would no longer be viewed with disdain. It would merely indicate that Wesley departed from the
then dominant theoretical model of theological activity because of his concern for the vital task
of rendering theological judgments on the life and practice of the church.25
In that case, the pertinent question would become: “Did Wesley pursue these judgments
in a theologically responsible and systematic manner?” As we have seen, an adequate answer to
this question involves both consideration of Wesley’ methods of theological investigation and
consideration of his approach to theological argumentation. Regarding the former, it has been
repeatedly demonstrated that Wesley pursued his theological reflection with a self-critical
awareness of the various sources of theology—the famous “Wesleyan quadrilateral”—and in
light of the most responsible methods of research of his day.26 This particular aspect need detain
us no longer.
The more pressing considerations pertain to Wesley’s approach to theological
argumentation. On one level, this would involve an analysis of the relative role and authority
Wesley gave to the various sources of theology in formulating a theological judgment. Paul
Hoon has provided a summary of this aspect of Wesley, emphasizing its practical or experience-
related character.
The procedure by which Wesley arrives at a doctrine consists, first, in deriving it
from and formulating it on the basis of Scripture; second, in testing and modifying it in
accord with experience; third, in testing it by reason; fourth, in testing it by tradition. …
The distinctive feature of this method lies in the high place given to experience and in the
manner in which Wesley systematically appeals to experience.27
This summary is helpful both in regards to stressing the primary role of Scripture and the
important role of individual and corporate28 experience in Wesley’s theological reflection.
However, in light of Sauter’s analysis of the systematic nature of theology, it is obvious that a
further question must be raised about Wesley’s theological argumentation. 
This further, and in our opinion most crucial, question is whether one can discern an
orienting concept (or set of related concepts) that provided a consistency to Wesley’s various
theological judgments. This question has rarely been addressed, even by those involved in the
recent renewed consideration of Wesley’s theology. The major reason is that this recent work
has largely limited itself to expositing and defending Wesley’s 
12
understanding of “the way to heaven.”29 Most of the research has dealt with individual aspects of
salvation such as justification30 and sanctification.31 The few more comprehensive introductions
to Wesley have been presented as summaries of his order of salvation.32 Even the two seeming
exceptions to this characterization, a treatment of Wesley’s Christology33 and one of his doctrine
of the Holy Spirit,34 deal with their subjects primarily in terms of their relation to the order to
salvation. 
Without denying the immense contributions to this recent work, it can be argued that Wesley’s
contribution to theology goes beyond his reflections on the order of salvation. It is true that
Wesley himself understood the core of his theology to lie in the order of salvation (cf. 8:46;
10:72).35 However, he did not restrict himself to this narrow group of topics. Within his works,
one can find treatments of almost every major issue of theology—sovereignty of God,
omniscience, atonement, etc.—and many of the secondary topics—angels, devils, nature of hell,
etc. Moreover, the topics and arrangements of his second series of sermons resemble the
classical Protestant “salvation history” model of a dogmatic.36 With some license, it could be
considered a lay-level theology handbook. 
In this light, a re-evaluation of the conventional low regard of Wesley as a systematic
theologian seems appropriate. As suggested above, the outcome of any such re-evaluation would
hinge on whether it can be demonstrated that Wesley utilized, at least implicitly, a central
orienting concept in rendering his various theological judgments.
Responsible Grace – Wesley’s Orienting Concept
The major thesis of this essay is that there is such an orienting concept in Wesley’s
theology; namely, the concept of responsible grace. To substantiate this thesis, it will be
necessary to first define this orienting concept and then illustrate its influence on Wesley’s
theological reflection. 
The orienting concept of responsible grace is not simply a doctrine discussed by Wesley.
It is a fundamental conviction about the nature of divine-human interaction which provided the
distinctive slant to all of Wesley’s theology. The most succinct expression Wesley gives of this
concept is actually a quote from St. Augustine: “He that made us without ourselves, will not save
us without ourselves” (6:513). That Wesley quotes Augustine in this regard is ironic for, as
Outler notes, “(Wesley’s) driving passion was to find a third alternative to Pelagian optimism
and Augustinian pessimism with respect to the human flaw and the human potential.”37 Wesley
found this third alternative in a concept of responsible grace, whereby salvation is clearly a gift
of God (we cannot save ourselves), but a gift that calls us to respond and to take responsibility
(God will not save us without ourselves).
In the first place, Wesley is utterly convinced that human beings have neither the existing
moral purity to merit salvation nor the power to achieve such purity on their own (8:49). If we
have even one good thought or one good desire, we should be careful to give the honor to God
because it is a gift of grace (6:398). Salvation, indeed even the desire for salvation, is
fundamentally a free gift of God offered to undeserving human persons (5:7–8). Far from
meriting this gift, we can only accept it in faith. Moreover, even the faith by which we accept
salvation is a gift of God (5:
13
62). Clearly, the theme of grace was central to Wesley’s preaching and theological reflection.38 
The theme of responsibility was just as central and provided a type of dialectical balance
to the theme of grace. It was Wesley’s conviction that, while God may on occasion irresistibly
constrain a person to perform a specific task in fulfilling divine providence, such was never the
case in relation to personal salvation (10:210). The gift of grace upon which salvation depends
operates such as to empower us to respond without compelling us to obey.39 By means of
prevenient grace, God acts upon every human person to enable them to enter into a saving
relationship with God. However, “God does not continue to act upon the soul, unless the soul
reacts upon God” (5:233; cf. 6: 49). We must respond to God’s grace and ultimately, we bear the
responsibility if we do not do so.
This theme of responsibility is not limited to the initial acceptance of salvation. Indeed,
Wesley’s most characteristic stress is on the continuing responsibility to put the grace of God to
work transforming our lives, lest it be received in vain (V, 144). Concerning this transformation,
Wesley is quite clear that even the most saintly Christian still stands in the tension found
between two confessions of Scripture: “Without me you can do nothing” and “I can do all things
through Christ strengthening me” (10: 478). Wesley gives a detailed description of this tension
in his sermon “On Working Out Our Own Salvation”:
(Firstly), inasmuch as God works in you, you are now able to work out your own
salvation. … You can do something, through Christ strengthening you. Stir up the spark
of grace which is now in you and [God] will give you more grace. Secondly, God
worketh in you; therefore you must work … otherwise [God] will cease working (6:
512–13).
In brief, Wesley understood the essential Christian message to be one of grace, but grace
which both called for and empowered human response thereby preserving human responsibility.
This, in his opinion, inescapable dialectic between grace and responsibility became the criterion
by which Wesley judged the adequacy of the various theological positions of his day For
example, while Luther’s writings had played a key role in helping Wesley clarify the primacy of
grace in Christian life,40 he sensed in Luther’s formulation of “justification by faith alone”41 an
overemphasis on the imputed nature of holiness (solifidianism) which severed the taproot of
human responsibility (1:186,315–16). He was convinced that this imbalance leads ultimately
either to an ethical and spiritual quietism like that of the Moravians (1:315, 257) or to an
enthusiastic antinomianism (11:430–32).
Calvin’s theology was also found wanting by Wesley. It is true that Calvin is often
mentioned with appreciation regarding subjects such as the imputation of Christ’s righteousness
to Christians (5:240) and the lack of all natural free-will (8:285). However, Wesley’s final
judgment is that Calvin emphasizes the sovereignty of God to the point of the logical and
practical denigration of human responsibility (7:373–86; 8:337; 10:211–59; 11:493–94). 
On the other side, Wesley was just as critical of those theological positions which
defended human responsibility in any way which obscured the fact that salvation is always of
grace, apart from any human merit. In 
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particular, he was critical of the traditional Roman Catholic understanding of salvation which
made justification contingent upon infused holiness (5:58). He also found it necessary to part
ways with his early mentor, William Law, when the latter denied justification by faith And
imputed righteousness as doctrines that undermined Christian piety (3:308; 5:245). For Wesley,
it is precisely our awareness of the unmerited nature of God’s grace that calls forth responsible
Christian living.
It is this dialectic between grace and responsibility that we are terming “responsible
grace.” It should be evident by now that the theme is present in Wesley’s theology. The claim
that it functioned as an orienting concept guiding Wesley’s various theological judgments
remains to be shown.
The Orienting Concept at Work
A brief review of the method of systematic theology suggested above will help clarify the
next step in our argument. In making theological judgments, a responsible or scholarly
theologian is obliged to consult the appropriate sources and develop a critical awareness of the
various alternatives. They must then either choose between the alternatives or find a way of
reconciling the apparent differences.42 The mark of a “systematic” theologian is that a basic
continuity can be discerned in these various theological decisions and formulations. The
remaining task of this essay is to demonstrate that there is such a basic consistency in Wesley
and that it is an expression of his fundamental conviction about “responsible grace.” This
demonstration will begin with an analysis of Wesley’s doctrine of God. Then programmatic
remarks on the other major areas of Wesley’s thought will be given. In each case, it will be
argued that the concerns embodied in the concept of responsible grace guide Wesley’s
formulations and decisions regarding theological options.
1. Doctrine of God
Wesley’s position regarding the various aspects of the doctrine of God has been chosen
for primary consideration because it provides the theological basis for his more extended
discussion of the order of salvation. Also, it has been cogently argued that the most basic
differences between Wesley’s theology and that of Calvin (as one example) lie at the level of
their respective doctrines of God.43
The major focus of Wesley’s reflection on the doctrine of God was the nature of God’s
sovereignty. His main point, directed at Calvin (as he understood Calvin) was that God’s
sovereignty should always be related to the other divine attributes (10:220). Failure to make this
relation would ultimately lead to an abstract and deterministic view of sovereignty which
undermined both God’s justice (10:216,363) and God’s love (10:229). It would also destroy
human responsibility (6:318; 10:362).
Moving beyond critique, Wesley provided several constructive proposals for
understanding the nature of God in a way that held divine sovereignty, mercy and justice
together. In the first place, he refused to follow the Nominalists in making a distinction between
God’s will and God’s nature (5:440–41). This removed the possibility of vindicating God’s
sovereign decisions by placing God above the divinely-established moral law. In the second
place, Wesley located the primary expression of God’s 
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sovereignty in the bestowal of mercy rather than in the abstract concept of self-sufficiency and
freedom.44 This move purged the notion of sovereignty of its frequent overtones of arbitrariness
and domination. Finally, Wesley argued at length that a conception of God wherein God could
interact effectively and providentially with human beings while still allowing a measure of
human free-agency does not detract from God’s glory. On the contrary, it immeasurably deepens
our sense of God’s glorious wisdom, justice and mercy (10:230–34; 6:317–18), without, at the
same time, undercutting human responsibility. 
This basic stance regarding God’s nature as loving and just finds expression in Wesley’s
judgments regarding several related issues. To cite just one example, it led him to opt for a
conception of divine foreknowledge that did not imply determinism. Wesley found such a
conception in the notion of eternity as above time. From this perspective, matters related to
personal salvation do not take place because God knows them. Rather, God knows them because
they take place (6:227). 
Clearly, Wesley’s judgments concerning the nature of God are congruent with the notion
of responsible grace outlined above. The more crucial point, which must now be argued, is that
Wesley’s strong convictions about responsible grace played a decisive role, albeit often
implicitly, in arriving at these judgments. As evidence for this assertion, consider the following
passage concerning the Calvinist conception of God’s sovereign predestining will:
It destroys all (God’s) attributes at once: It overturns both His justice, mercy and truth. …
You represent God as worse than the devil; more false, more cruel, more unjust. But you
say you will prove it by Scripture. Hold! What will you prove by Scripture? that God is
worse than the devil? It cannot be … better to say (Scripture) has no sense at all, than to
say it had such a sense as this. … No Scripture can mean that God is not love, or that His
mercy is not over all His works (7:382–83).
Note how Wesley’s convictions about the mercy and justice of God become criteria for
determining the meaning of Scripture. In all fairness, this quote must be balanced by Wesley’s
claim that his convictions about God’s justice and love are thoroughly grounded in Scripture
(10:211). Nonetheless, it is a clear illustration of at least one area where Wesley’s basic
convictions about responsible grace were a decisive influence in his determination of issues of
Christian doctrine and practice.
The consistency with which this influence was expressed throughout Wesley’s thought
can be suggested by some programmatic reflections on the other major areas of his thought.
2. Doctrine of Christ
Wesley did not engage in detailed reflections on Christology. However, his concern for
responsible grace can be found in his scattered remarks. It is evident in his defense of Christ’s
active righteousness as a supplement to his passive righteousness, thereby qualifying Christ as a
model for Christian behavior (5:236). It is also evident in his concern to retain the rejection of
human merit evident in the classical satisfaction model of the 
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atonement while, at the same time, repudiating any human tendency to rely on Christ’s
righteousness imputed to us and neglect the demand for inherent righteousness (5:244).45
3. Doctrine of Humanity
Wesley’s convictions about responsible grace are at the heart of his doctrine of humanity.
There is no clearer expression of the dialectic between God’s gift and human responsibility in
Wesley’s thought than his well-known conjunction of a strong doctrine of original sin with an
equally strong doctrine of God’s universal prevenient grace.46 This conjunction allows Wesley to
deny all natural human merit and power while at the same time calling on sinners to respond to
God’s offer of grace and take responsibility for their lives in Christ. It must be admitted that
Wesley was not always careful, particularly in his later writings, to give equal emphasis on both
sides of this dialectic.47 However, this can be attributed to the one-sided (anti-Calvinist)
controversies in which he was embroiled at the time. As a theologian seeking to address the
present needs of his church, he did not have the luxury of detached contemplation which makes
possible ideally balanced formulations.
4. Doctrine of Salvation
The influence of Wesley’s perspective of responsible grace is also evident in every major
area of his doctrine of salvation. At the most basic level, its influence can be seen in his
definition of major terms. For example, he defines salvation as not merely deliverance from hell
or going to heaven, but a present deliverance from sin (8:47; cf. 12:71). “Grace” is taken to
include not merely our free acceptance by God, but the power of God at work in us both to will
and to do according to God’s good pleasure (9:103). And, faith is understood to be more than
mere assent. It is a disposition wrought in our heart that is productive of good works (5:12, 168,
205). Accordingly, in Wesley’s terms, salvation by grace through faith can never be understood
in an antinomian sense. But neither can it be understood as self-salvation, for Wesley is quite
clear that the love which transforms our lives is a gift of God (5:39–40). 
The tension between grace and responsibility is expressed structurally when the
possibility of growth in Christ-likeness (sanctification) is made contingent on God’s gracious
acceptance (justification), while the continuance in God’s acceptance (justification) is made
contingent on growth in Christ-likeness (sanctification).48 It is this dual tension that allows
Wesley to integrate “faith alone” with “holy living” in an authentic dialectic.49 A logical
corollary of this tension is Wesley’s affirmation of the third use of, the law-to guide Christian
life (5:443).
The most distinctive element in Wesley’s doctrine of salvation is his affirmation of the
possibility of entire sanctification.50 This affirmation has been the focus of numerous critical
evaluations. These evaluations typically charge Wesley with overlooking the presence of sin in
all believers and with over-evaluating the natural human ability to conquer sin.51 Obviously, such
charges, if true, would be in radical conflict with the principle of responsible grace articulated
above. However, a careful reading of Wesley proves the charges to be ungrounded.52
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Wesley states quite clearly that the experience of entire sanctification, if ever obtained, is
a gift of God, not a product of human effort (5:164). At the same time, he stresses human
responsibility in relation to entire sanctification. In the first place, Wesley considers the
possibility of entire sanctification to hinge on a prior (typically long) period of responsible
growth in grace which includes progressive victory over the sinful inclinations that remain in the
life of a believer (sanctification in the larger sense of the word) (6:454; 11:402-3).53 His major
emphasis clearly lies on this ongoing process of Christian growth because he is (theoretically)
willing to concede the possibility that entire sanctification may be a reality only at or shortly
preceding death (5:165; 11:372).54. In the second place, Wesley stresses the element of human
responsibility within the state of entire sanctification itself by emphasizing the continuing need
for growth in Christ-likeness even here (6:5; 7:202), the absence of which would ultimately lead
to the loss of the experience (6:419).55 Indeed, it is characteristic of Wesley that his first advice
to those who claimed entire sanctification was to avoid pride, enthusiasm and antinomianism.56
In brief, while the affirmation of the possibility of entire sanctification may be distinctive of
Wesley, the conception of sanctification (as a whole) as the progressive responsible application
of the free grace of God is characteristic of Wesley. It was, thus, no accident that Wesley chose
as a motto for the Methodists the phrase “not as though I had already attained.”57
5. Doctrine of the Church
Wesley’s comments on the doctrine of the church are sparse and reflect significantly his
Anglican training.58 However, the influence of his conception of responsible grace can be
detected here as well. In particular, it is evident in his argument that the “holiness” of the church
must be more than its holiness “in Christ.” It must be a holiness that is expressed, in varying
degrees, in the lives of its members (6:400).
6. Doctrine of Sacraments
Concerning Wesley’s doctrine of the sacraments, one can do no better than to quote the
conclusion of the definitive study on this subject: “We find in him a combination of emphasis
upon God’s work as basic and essential, although without destroying man as man. There is a
necessity for objective means of grace, but these are never seen as static or ends in
themselves.”59 Such an emphasis is clearly in line with the principle of responsible grace. At the
same time, it seems fair to say that Wesley never consistently developed the implications of his
radical reaffirmation of grace in 1738 for the doctrine of the sacraments.60 This is particularly
true in regard to the issue of infant baptism.61
7. Doctrine of Eschatology
Finally, the influence of Wesley’s conviction about responsible grace can be detected in
his scattered comments regarding eschatology. In general, he preserves the tension between the
“already” and the “not yet” of the presence of the Kingdom in the world.62 Thereby, he can reject
quietism without endorsing enthusiasm.
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Conclusion – Implications
The basic argument of this essay is that there is an underlying unity in Wesley’s various
situation-related theological reflections which is due to the influence, implicit or explicit, of a
key orienting concept-responsible grace. If this argument is cogent, then it has several
implications for Wesley studies and Wesleyan theology.
In the first place, an awareness of the unifying perspective of Wesley’s work provides a
significant help in understanding and relating the various parts of Wesley’s thought. It also
provides a criterion by which to assess claims about unresolved tensions or significant changes
in Wesley’s perspective.63 
Perhaps more importantly, an awareness of the defining perspective of Wesley’s
theological reflection provides a criterion for guiding and/or assessing contemporary expressions
of Wesleyan theology.64 Albert Outler has issued a timely call for a new phase in Wesley studies
which moves beyond presentations of Wesley as either an idealized figure or a mere endorser of
particular popular causes. Replacing these earlier phases, Outler envisions an approach to
theology wherein Wesley plays the role of magister or guide-“another of those voices behind us
saying ‘This is the way, walk in it.’”65 In light of the preceding analysis, it can be suggested that
the way Wesley would lead us is in seeking an evermore consistent and relevant expression of
“responsible grace.” At times, this may mean correcting or moving beyond Wesley himself.66
Often, it will mean liberating Wesley from the tradition of later Wesleyan theologians who have
lost the dynamic balance embodied in the concept of responsible grace.67 Always, it will mean
carrying out our theological reflections in a way that addresses the burning needs of the present
church and world.
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